In this paper we empirically examine the impact of labor market flexibility on FDI flows to oilrich GCC and compare it to middle income countries in 2006-2011. We account for potential endogeneity and nonstationarity and adopt system GMM and IV estimation methodologies. Our findings show that in middle income countries overall flexibility increases FDI flows under both system GMM and IV methodologies. In GCC countries overall LMF decreases FDI flows under system GMM methodology. Results also show a positive "GCC region" influence outweighing the negative flexibility influence. Growth potential and infrastructure development matter for both GCC and middle income countries.
Introduction
The GCC countries have embarked on economic diversification, which aims at reducing reliance on natural resources and avoiding the natural resource curse. The natural resource curse can manifest itself in a number of respects: lower growth, lower quality institutions and more conflicts compared to resource-poor economies (Collier and Goderis 2007; Frankel 2012; Mehlum et al. 2006; Warner 1995 and . Reliance on natural resources as a major source of income exposes the GCC economies not only to global business cycle and the associated volatility of world oil price in the short run but also to the exhaustion of these resources over the long run.
The oil resource curse can manifest itself in the labor market. Soto and Haouas (2012) identify symptoms of the resource curse in the UAE in terms of low labor productivity growth, massive overemployment, and declining productivity in the public sector. The UAE 2007-2011 growth rate of real GDP per person employed, as a measure of labor productivity growth, amounts to 6 percent. 3 This rate is positive increasing job security and benefits to nationals working in the private sector. 5 However, providing protective labor market institutions may reduce labor market flexibility (LMF) for the private sector, discourage FDI inflows, and thus stifle the reduction in unemployment among nationals. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) and Delbecque et al. (2007) , for example, have shown that rigid labor market institutions increase total labor cost in European countries to the detriment to FDI inflows.
The extent to which FDI inflows to GCC countries are related to GCC labor market characteristics and policies is the motivation of this research. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been examined in the literature before. To address this challenging issue, we empirically examine the influence of LMF -as a host economy location determinant -on FDI flows per capita to GCC countries in comparison to middle income countries. Using panel data on GCC and middle income countries for the period 2006-2011 and adopting system GMM and IV estimation methodologies, the paper finds that in middle income countries under both methodologies overall LMF increases FDI flows per capita while redundancy costs decrease it.
In contrast, in GCC countries overall LMF (under system GMM methodology), and pay and productivity and professional management (under IV methodology) reduce FDI inflows per capita. There is a net positive influence of being a GCC country, however.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a description of labor nationalization policies in the UAE, as the second largest GCC economy experiencing high unemployment rate among national youth, and highlights the controversy between labor nationalization (Emiratization) policies and attracting FDI inflows. Section three provides a brief review of the literature on the relationship between LMF and FDI . Section four specifies the empirical model and the data sources. Section five discusses the empirical issues and estimation methodology. Section six presents and discusses the results, section seven provides robustness checks, while section eight concludes. 5 The gap in employment conditions between private and public sector in favor of the latter is the main reason why GCC nationals prefer working in the public sector.
UAE Labor Nationalization Controversy
This section describes the evolution of UAE labor nationalization policy over time and points to the associated potential conflict between reducing unemployment and promoting FDI goals. 6 The section draws on Cammett and Posusney (2010) , Koji (2011) , and Randeree (2012) .
The history of reliance on expatriates in the UAE dates back to the discovery of oil. After the discovery and production of oil in the 1950s and 1960s, most companies relied on workers from neighboring countries due to the lack of local human resources. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the UAE followed a relatively laissez faire employment policy. In 2004 the UAE population reached 4.5 million, only 20 percent of whom were UAE nationals (Al-Ali 2008) . By 2006, slightly more than 90 percent of the 2.4 million labor force was expatriate workers (Schiphorst 2004; Abdelkarim and Haan 2002) . Most UAE nationals are employed in the public sector due to its superior employment conditions in comparison to the private sector with higher remuneration, better job security, shorter working hours, and generous vacations.
With heavy reliance on expatriate labor in the private sector, high unemployment among nationals, and a relatively young Emirati population entering the labor force since the mid 2010s, the UAE government has embarked on labor nationalization policy or what is known as Emiratization. The purpose of this policy is to increase the participation of nationals in the private sector. The federal government established in 1999 a specialized agency, TANMIA, the objectives of which are to achieve full employment of nationals, reduce the number of expatriates in the total workforce, and develop and increase the supply of qualified and skilled nationals to meet the labor market needs.
7
To push Emiratization ahead in the private sector, the government implemented a quota policy by the late 1990s initially targeting the banking sector. In 1999, the UAE Cabinet issued a decree requiring all banks operating in the country to increase recruitment of UAE nationals by 4 percent each year. By 2003, slightly more than one quarter of the employees of the 47 independent banks and 454 branches in operation were
Emirati nationals, and nearly three quarters of operating banks achieved their quota targets (TANMIA 2004). 6 We do not describe the evolution of labor nationalization policy in GCC countries for brevity. An overview of this policy is provided in Randeree (2012) . 7 The private sector still faces challenges in hiring qualified Emiratis nevertheless (Forstenlechner et al. 2012) .
A number of banks have recorded increased nationalization, achieving an average Emiratization rate of 34.4 percent across all UAE banks by 2010.
Besides the quota policy which encourages the demand for national workers, other measures have been proposed. Proposed measures have included increasing the job security of nationals in the private sector, the adoption of a two-day weekend system, and increasing holidays in order to increase national labor supply.
Setting a minimum wage for Emiratis has also been proposed. 8 However, it would distort the flexibility of the wage setting process and introduce rigidities in the labor market.
Although the quota policy has had a relatively positive impact on Emiratization, it remains a controversial issue between the government and the private sector. The private sector complains about the inferior quality of national workers in terms of skills, efficiency, work ethics, and the associated high economic costs (Harry 2007) . 9 Accordingly, the private sector advances the reliance on expatriate workers instead. While the government, on the other hand, admits the need to train and develop national labor skills and qualifications, it asserts that the relative cost of hiring expatriate workers is too low thus rendering the competition between expatriates and nationals unfair.
To reduce the gap between expatriate and national workers, a number of suggestions have been proposed, including the imposition of fees and taxes on expatriate workers and expatriate hiring companies.
The Federal National Council's Emiratization committee has called on the government to subsidize the difference between low private sector and high government and public sector salaries to encourage hiring of nationals in the private sector. Maktoum Foundation (MRMF), more than 70 percent of CEOs in the GCC countries think that local hiring plans will not help improve their companies' performance. Al-Ali (2008) reports that the low fluency in English language and low levels of self-confidence are barriers to nationals workforce participation.
Additionally Harry (2007) posits that "the formal or informal rights of the nationals compared to alternative candidates cause employers to avoid recruiting them".
In summary, in pursuit of reducing unemployment rate of nationals and creating job opportunities for future generations, UAE labor market institutions have shown a movement from flexible institutions towards less flexible ones. National labor quotas and minimum wages, among other policies, may distort hiring decisions, reduce wage determination flexibility, and discourage FDI flows.
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Literature Review
Strands of the FDI literature have empirically examined the FDI influence of quality of institutions (Wei 2000; Asiedu 2002; Busse and Hefeker 2007; Benassy-Quere et al. 2007; Daude and Stein 2007; Naudé and Krugell 2007; Mina 2007 Mina , 2009 Mina and 2011 Mishra and Daly 2007; Du et al. 2008) , intellectual property protection (Javorcik 2004) , environmental standards (Keller and Levinson 2002; Javorcik and Wei 2004) , and taxation (Hines 1996; Devereux and Griffith 1998) . One strand has empirically examined the influence of labor market institutions on FDI (Culem 1988; Cheng and Kwan 2000; Delbecque et al. 2007; Mogab et al. 2013; Lee 2003; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005; Leibrecht and Scharler 2009; Olney 2011; and Parcon 2008) .
In analyzing the impact of labor market characteristics on FDI inflows, the academic literature has originally focused on the impact of labor cost as part of the firm's production cost. The conventional assumption is that foreign investors are rational agents seeking to minimize production costs. Studies have mainly used the average wage rate and unit labor cost as measures of labor cost. For instance, Culem (1988) analyzed bilateral flows of direct investments among six industrialized countries (the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium) and showed that unit labor cost of the host country is a deterrent to FDI, a result Cheng and Kwan (2000) reached in estimating the determinants of FDI in 29 Chinese regions.
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Although wage cost is a direct component of labor cost, other indirect components are influenced by labor market institutions. Labor market institutions refer to the rules and regulations that govern the 11 Foreign investors are assumed rational profit-seekers.
12 Interestingly, none of the education variables serving as proxies for labor quality had a significant impact on FDI. This finding seems counter-intuitive. However this result is explained more by South China's preferential policy and geographical proximity to Hong Kong as opposed to higher education attainment.
functioning of labor markets, including employment protection legislation (EPL), trade union activities, and minimum wage legislations. EPL includes the flexibility of dismissal and notice and severance payment.
Labor market institutions are considered flexible when labor market outcomes are the result of free market mechanism, without any regulation imposed by the governments or trade unions (Whyman and Baimbridge 2006) . They affect both wage and non-wage costs. Specifically, the more protective EPL, the higher the nonwage and labor costs are.
Many studies have analyzed the relationship between labor market institutions characteristics and FDI flows, hypothesizing that rigid institutions would be detrimental to FDI inflows through their effects on increased non-wage cost. 13 Using firm-level data in 14 Western and 5 Central and Eastern European countries, 14 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) investigate the influence of the degree of LMF and the difference in LMF in host and home countries on the location of foreign subsidiaries and aggregate firm-level FDI flows, respectively. They find a positive relationship between LMF, whether absolute or in country difference terms, on the one hand and the probability of locating FDI in the host country and FDI inflows on the other. Using panel data on bilateral FDI stocks and employment protection indices for OECD countries, Dewit et al. (2009) find that for a given level of employment protection in the home country, a higher level of employment protection in the host country discourages home country firms from investing abroad. The absolute level of employment protection in the home country is also negatively correlated with outward FDI, exhibiting an "anchorage effect." In addition, a strong union density has a negative impact on inward FDI. Similar to Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) , Olney (2011) examines the influence of EPL on U.S. outward investment in 26 OECD countries, and finds that a reduction in EPL increases FDI. Delbecque et al. (2007) analyze French firms' expansion strategies in 77 countries during 1992-2001 and find that stringent EPL and a generous unemployment benefit system in the host country negatively impact firms' location decisions. The effect of EPL is modest however compared to the impact of market potential. Analyzing FDI flows from Japan to 29
13 According to Whyman and Baimbridge (2006) and Moran (1998) , a quarter to about one-third of total labor costs in European countries is non-wage costs.
14 The focus on European countries reflects the chronic labor market institutions rigidity many countries in the region suffer from.
OECD countries using annual data for the period 1989-2000, Lee (2003) finds that EPL has a negative impact on Japanese FDI shares in host countries.
15 Surprisingly, his study demonstrated that countries exhibiting a centralized bargaining structure attract more Japanese FDI than countries with a more decentralized one.
While the above studies find a negative relationship between rigid labor market institutions and FDI, other studies fail to reach a similar conclusion on the basis that rigid institutions increase labor productivity or are less important to foreign investor's objective of overcoming trade barriers. Using International Labor
Organization labor market standards and World Bank's labor market regulatory indicators, Parcon (2008) analyzes FDI flows to 195 countries during 1990-2005 and finds evidence that labor market standards exert negative and positive impact on FDI flows. Labor market standards increase firms' total variable costs and thus decrease FDI inflows -a cost channel. On the other hand, they decrease firm's marginal costs and increase productivity -a productivity channel. She also finds that some labor market standards promote human capital development reinforcing the productivity channel and enhance political and social stability.
Both effects encourage FDI inflows.
More recently, Mogab et al. (2013) examine the effects of labor market rigidities on FDI flows using firm-level data for European Multinational Enterprises investment in 41 European countries during [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . They focus on the influence of three labor market indicators: the rigidity of hours' index, the firing costs, and the difficulty of hiring index. They find that the rigidity of working hours indicator is negatively correlated to FDI inflows for all countries taken together. However, when controlling for country classification, they find that the indicator of rigidity in firing is unexpectedly positively related to FDI inflows in non-transition economies for three of the four years studied. Interestingly, when taking all European countries together, they find that increased rigidity in the labor market hiring indicator increased the probability of FDI inflows. These results suggest that foreign investors may have different objectives for investing in host countries, such as avoiding trade barriers or reducing production costs compared to the home country, and that flexible labor market institutions may not necessarily attract more FDI.
15 Note also that, focusing on the effect of the quality of institutions, Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) confirm the findings of these papers by showing negative relationship between employment protection and inward FDI.
Empirical Model and Data
The empirical model adopted in this paper builds conceptually on the FDI location determinants of Dunning's (1981) 
where FDI is FDI inflows in per capita terms. FDI (aggregate) flows data are used for two purposes. First, aggregate flows compared to stock data would tend to be relatively closer to bilateral or sectorial FDI data, and therefore may better reflect the influence of labor market institutions on them. Second, flows are used to reduce the problem of non-stationarity associated with FDI stock data, which can result in spurious correlation. In addition FDI is expressed in per capita terms, and not relative to GDP, to isolate potential reversal causality.
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GROWTH is market potential as measured by real GDP growth rate. Rapidly growing economies provide foreign investors with better opportunities for making profit compared to slowly growing economies (Chakrabarti 2001) . Chakrabarti (2001) reports positive influence of growth on FDI flows in Bandera and White (1968) , Lunn (1980) , Schneider and Frey (1985) , Culem (1988) , Billington (1999) , and Choe (2003) .
GROWTH is therefore expected to have a positive influence on FDI flows.
TRADE is trade openness as measured by the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP.
Asiedu (2002) Cooperation in labor-employer relations refers to the nature of relation between the two whether it is cooperative (7) or confrontational (1). The flexibility of wage determination refers to the wage determination mechanism. Wages could be set at the company level (7) or through a centralized bargaining process (1).
Hiring and firing procedures refer to whether these procedures are flexibly determined by employers (7) or impeded by regulations (1). Redundancy costs estimate the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments, and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, expressed in weekly wages. Pay and productivity refers to the extent pay is related to productivity; they would be strongly related (7) or unrelated
(1). Reliance on professional management refers to how senior management is selected. Positions can be selected based on merit and qualifications (7) income countries compared to 4.3 percent for GCC countries. However, the inclusion of middle income countries individually, potentially introduces heterogeneity, which is dealt with using the system GMM estimator as discussed in the next section.
Accordingly the modified empirical model is now expressed as: 
where GCC and GCCLABOR are the GCC country dummy and the interaction of GCC and LABOR variables, 
Empirical Issues and Estimation Methodology
The empirical issues we address in this paper are potential endogeneity arising from the presence of unobserved country specific effects and the presence of panel unit roots. Endogeneity, defined as the correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term, could result in inconsistent ordinary least System rather than difference GMM estimation is used as the latter suffers weak instrument problem, affecting its asymptotic properties (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998) , and consequently both point estimates and hypothesis tests become unreliable. For system GMM, lagged differences of explanatory variables are used as instruments, assuming the absence of serial correlation in the error term, and between these instruments and the error term. We use the Arellano-Bond test to test the lack of second-order serial correlation and the Hansen/Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions to test for instrument validity.
We also collapse the instruments to avoid the instrument proliferation issue and finite sample bias.
Instrument proliferation can become an issue with the growth in time dimension. The Hansen instrument orthogonality test under system GMM might suffer notable size distortion, which results in poor detection of orthogonality violation (Che et al. 2013 ). Roodman (2009) suggests collapsing the instruments to overcome this problem and also mitigate the finite sample bias.
Empirical Results
To get a flavor of the labor market performance in the different regions, The positive and negative relationship with overall LMF in middle income and GCC countries, respectively, is also confirmed with correlation coefficients (Table 2) . FDI inflows (per capita) show highest positive and negative correlation with overall LMF and redundancy costs, respectively, in middle income countries. In GCC countries the (positive) correlation is highest with professional management. Reverse causality, between FDI on the one hand and GDP growth rate, trade openness, financial development, labor market efficiency and the quality of domestic institutions on the other hand, is a potential source of endogeneity and a concern in this paper. Granger causality tests reject the null hypothesis that FDI (7=best) Graphs by region_classification does not Granger-cause trade openness and flexibility at the 5 percent significance level suggesting potential endogeneity (Table 3) . Being a GCC country increases FDI flows per capita by more than US$4,000 in specification 1. This GCC regional advantage, compared to other middle income countries, does not hold in the remaining specifications however. In specification 1, LMF in GCC countries reduces FDI inflows by nearly US$750. The net effect of being a GCC country on FDI inflows per capita is about US$208 (evaluated at the period mean).
Robustness Checks
We undertook robustness check of the estimation methodology. Instead of using system GMM approach, we adopted an instrumental variables approach instrumenting for TRADE and the overall LMF dimension of LABOR. We also accounted for heteroskedasticity associated with the use of middle income countries and autocorrelation in the time series. The results for the middle income countries are reported in while the significance of the coefficients of the GCC variables (in the same specification) disappears. In specification 7, professional management exerts a negative influence on FDI inflows to the GCC countries.
However, being a GCC country has a positive net influence of FDI inflows of nearly US$160 per capita (evaluated at the period mean). 
Concluding Remarks
This paper has been motivated by the policy controversy over the liberalization of labor market institutions in GCC countries and its potential conflict with labor nationalization policies. This controversy is supported by the casual observation of a peculiar negative relationship between flexible LMI and FDI inflows to GCC countries, unlike the same positive relationship for other regions.
The paper undertakes an empirical examination of the influence of LMF on FDI in GCC countries and comparator sample of middle income countries using 2006-2011 panel data. The paper robustly finds in the comparator middle income countries that overall LMF increases FDI flows per capita economically significantly while redundancy costs decrease it insignificantly. In contrast in GCC countries, overall LMF (under system GMM estimation methodology) and professional management (under IV estimation methodology) reduce FDI inflows per capita supporting the casually observed negative relationship. The negative influence of LMI is outweighed by positive "GCC region" influence, resulting in a net positive GCC influence.
Given the current controversy regarding labor nationalization policies in GCC countries, the main implication of our results is that a shift towards labor force nationalization and the likely reduction in LMF is not necessarily a deterrent to FDI flows. Our results lend support to other perhaps more important determinants of FDI flows, such as market potential and infrastructure development consistent with Mina (2007) . The positive influence of these determinants more than overcomes the negative influence of the increase in non-wage costs associated with less flexible labor market institutions. In this respect, our interpretation is similar to that of Mogab et al. (2013) who suggest that foreign investors are more driven by gaining market access as opposed to minimizing total labor cost.
As our result seems to suggest that more rigidity of labor market institutions would attract FDI in GCC countries, further investigation of the effect of government intervention is needed. In that respect, analyzing the behavior of foreign investors from a political economy standpoint, where the latter compare the benefits of regulation in terms of increased productivity and human capital development as suggested by Parcon (2008) and their associated wage and non-wage cost, would be promising. Similarly, the other counter-intuitive result suggesting that more professional management distracts FDI calls for investigating the political economy factors affecting FDI flows.
